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Pakistan-Russia Relations and the Unfolding 
“New Great Game” in South Asia
Tahir Amin
The historical and territorial conflict between India and Pakistan dominates 
the political scene in South Asia, and this conflict is also one of the regional 
tensions that keeps the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan 
unsettled and agitated. Because India-Pakistan relations are very much a 
“zero-sum” conflict (that is, a loss for one party is interpreted as a 
corresponding gain for the other party), the region is a type of political 
terrain that readily absorbs the geopolitical rivalries of external powers and 
weaves them into the bilateral conflict. It is against this background of the 
Cold War legacy in the region that this chapter examines the present-day 
relationship between Pakistan and Russia. It inquires how this bilateral 
relationship has transformed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
what prospects it has for contributing to the security and stability of the 
region when the Western military presence declines in Afghanistan. 
Although the wider region has undergone profound changes over the 
past decades, change in Pakistan-Russia relations has been only modest. The 
problematic legacy of their mostly hostile relationship with each other during 
the Cold War continues to cast its shadow. From the point of view of 
Islamabad, any improvement in this relationship is difficult when Russia at 
the same time continues to maintain a robust strategic relationship with India, 
thereby raising serious security concerns in Pakistan over strategic stability 
in South Asia. Russia also supports India in its goal to gain a permanent seat 
in the UN Security Council. The interpretation is common in Islamabad that 
the main reason why Russia seems reluctant to engage in closer cooperation 
with Pakistan, especially in regard to the sale of military hardware, is the 
priority it gives to its relations with India.1 Despite high-level visits from 
both countries not much concrete progress has been generated in Pakistan’s 
                                                          
1 The following articles discuss Russia-Pakistan relations from the perspectives of the two 
countries: Vyacheslav Belokrenitsky and Sergei Kamenev, “Russia and Pakistan: A view 
from Moscow,” Pakistan Horizon 66, no.1–2 (January–April 2013); Muhammad Nawaz 
Khan and Beenish Altaf, “Pakistan-Russia Rapprochement and Current Geo-politics,” 
Islamabad Policy Research Institute Journal 13, no. 1 (Winter 2013).
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relations with Russia during the last decades. However, more recently there 
have also been signs of change. 
In the wake of the on-going Ukrainian crisis and the implementation of 
American and European sanctions, Russia has begun to re-evaluate its 
policies in South Asia as part of Russian President Putin’s “reaching East” 
strategy. A new opening in the relationship was provided by the visit of 
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu in Islamabad on November 20, 
2014. This was the first high-level visit since the visit of Prime Minister 
Mikhail Fradkov to Pakistan in April 2007. Shoigu’s visit was all the more 
significant due to the fact that President Vladimir Putin’s visit, which had 
been planned for October 2012, had been unexpectedly cancelled, and this 
had been widely interpreted as a “major setback” which had made it clear 
that the post-Cold War relationship between the two countries still lacked a 
solid basis.2 Shoigu’s visit also bore concrete results: a cooperation 
agreement on security and defense issues was signed and, thus, the 
relationship between both states became more institutionalized. 
The consequences of the “endgame” in Afghanistan will be significant in 
the wider region and they will immediately be felt in Pakistan,3 but it is still 
too early to argue what exactly they will be and how they will impact 
Pakistan’s relations with Russia in particular. The question that has inspired 
the writing of this chapter is how the Pakistan-Russia relationship is 
preparing for the change. We argue that a potential convergence of interests 
is on the horizon in Pakistan-Russia relations as the U.S. and its allies 
prepare to depart from Afghanistan.4 Russia is interested in cooperation with 
Pakistan in terms of building a defense capacity around Afghanistan so as to 
prevent the spreading of unrest from this country into surrounding areas and, 
ultimately, to Russia’s borders. While this is in harmony with the approach 
of its policies in Central Asia as well, the problematic issue is how the two 
parties will be able to build cooperation against the background of their 
                                                          
2 Raja Mohammad Khan, “Deferral of Putin’s Schedule Visit,” Pakistan Observer, October 
1, 2012, http://pakobserver.net/201210/01/detailnews.asp?id=176091.
3 Dmitri Trenin and Alexei Malashenko, Afghanistan: A view from Moscow (Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010); Thomas Kunze and Michael 
Logvinov, “Central Asia facing ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan: Islamist threats and 
regional solutions,” International Reports of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, December 18, 
2013, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36412-544-2-30.pdf?131218151342.
4 Nazir Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations: Lost opportunities and Future Options,” Journal of 
Political Studies 19, no. 1 (Summer 2012): 78–89.
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contradictory interests in regard to India and the mutual suspicions that have 
existed between them throughout the decades since Pakistan achieved its 
independence. 
Research on Pakistan-Russia relations generally employs traditional 
realist frameworks when analyzing the relationship between the two 
countries.5 While this approach can be helpful in analytical reconstructions 
of the “zero-sum game” between India and Pakistan, it provides very limited 
perspectives for analyzing the more comprehensive regional dynamics that 
exist. Western presence is waning not only militarily but also economically 
and culturally, and Russia cannot offer any social order to replace the 
Western liberal order. Because the issues of a desirable social order today 
cannot be left to the side, and because the region cannot be considered 
merely a chessboard for the mutual rivalries of major powers—as is the case 
when the notion of the historical “Great Game” is invoked—it is also 
misleading to interpret a possible increase of Russian influence in the region 
from the perspective of its geopolitical rivalry with the U.S. Rather, we may 
recognize that a “new great game” is unfolding with intricate patterns of 
interaction that involve both strategic competition and economic cooperation 
between multiple “world orders.” Such orders are not simply predetermined 
by nature or history; instead, they are geographically linked socio-historical 
unities of practices. These interpretative unities are identifiable on the basis 
of patterned regularities in the relationships between international or world 
actors or in their relations with their social and natural environment.6 The 
regions of Central and South-Central Asia are a good illustration of how 
                                                          
5 As examples of previous research on Pakistan-Russia relations the following can be 
mentioned: Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, Pakistan and the Great Powers: A Study of 
Pakistan’s Foreign Policy 1954–1970, 2nd rev. ed., (Karachi:  Royal Book Co., 1999); 
Werner Levi, “Pakistan, the Soviet Union, and China,” Pacific Affairs 35, no. 3 (Autumn 
1962): 211–22; G. W. Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and the Major Powers: 
Politics of a Divided Subcontinent (New York: The Free Press, 1975); Mahboob A. Popatia,
The Perspective of Pakistan-Soviet Union Relations 1947–1979 (Karachi: Pakistan Study 
Center, 1988); Hafeez A. Malik, ed., Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and 
Afghanistan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1987); Syed Riffat Hussain, “Pak-Soviet 
Relations since 1947: A Dissenting Appraisal,” Strategic Studies (Spring 1987): 64–88; 
Maqbool Ahmad Bhatti, Great Powers and South Asia: Post-Cold War Trends (Islamabad: 
Institute of Regional Studies, 1996).
6 This perspective synthesizes insights from the Dialectics of World Orders approach 
articulated by Hayward Alker, Thomas Biersteker, Takashi Inoguchi and Tahir Amin. 
According to these authors, multiple world orders are socio-historical entities that can be 
identified in our multi-cultural and multi-religious world. See Renée Marlin-Bennett, ed., 
Alker and IR: Global studies in an Interconnected World (London: Routledge, 2012).
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multiple world orders—some authors have identified the Western liberal, 
Russian-Slavic, Islamic, Indic, and also a residual Socialist order—overlap, 
intermingle and coexist simultaneously.7 In the following, we review the past 
decades of Pakistan-Soviet and Pakistan-Russia relations and examine how 
the present changes unfold in such broader contexts.
Historical Burden of the Soviet Decades
Although the frame itself was ideological, it was mainly as a geopolitical 
contest that Soviet policies were perceived in South Asia. It did not go 
unnoticed in Pakistan that the Soviet Union under Stalin initially displayed 
an indifferent attitude towards the emergence of India and Pakistan in 1947. 
It regarded their independence as “illusory,” indeed, as a part of British 
policy to “divide and rule” in order to perpetuate its control over India by 
creating two hostile states and acting as arbiter between them.8 Nationalist 
leaders in the two countries were seen as “stooges of British imperialism.”
The creation of Pakistan was considered even worse than that of India 
because of the religious rationale of the independence movement. It was 
against the backdrop of the unfolding Cold War that the Soviet Union, when 
the U.S. invited Indian Prime Minister Jawahar Lal Nehru to visit in 1949, 
immediately extended an invitation to Moscow to Pakistan’s Prime Minister 
Liaqat Ali Khan—even though Pakistan at that time had not even established 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. However, Liaqat Ali Khan chose 
to go to Washington instead of Moscow, possibly using the Soviet invitation 
as a bargaining chip to extract an invitation from the U.S. This incident 
created deep mistrust between the Soviet Union and Pakistan.9
Pakistan joined the U.S.-sponsored alliances of SEATO (1954) and 
CENTO (1955), which were aimed at the containment of communism, and it 
eventually become “the most allied ally” of the United States in Asia. The 
main purpose of the Pakistani decision-makers was to seek military 
assistance against India, which was four times larger and perceived as 
                                                          
7 Tahir Amin, “World Orders in Central Asia,” in Alker and IR, 71–86.
8 D. N. Durke, Soviet Russia and Indian Community in 1917–1947 (New York: Broochman 
Associates, 1959), 269–83.
9 Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 123.
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Pakistan’s principal security threat because of the unresolved dispute over 
Kashmir.10 Soviet-Indian relations were further strengthened during the 
1960s, when India became a leading country in the Non-Aligned Movement. 
The Soviet Union gave its strong support to India on the Kashmir issue and 
twice used its veto in the UN Security Council in India’s favor. It also began 
to cultivate its relations with Afghanistan and extended its support for the 
issue of Pashtunistan, which had developed into a border issue between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan.11 Soviet-Pakistani relations hit rock bottom when 
a U.S. U-2 plane (flown from Peshawar in Pakistan for espionage purposes) 
was shot down by the Soviets in 1960 and Premier Nikita Khrushchev 
subsequently threatened to annihilate Peshawar with rockets.12
Anxious over the threats issuing from the Soviet Union and also 
increasingly disenchanted with the U.S. for courting India (as U.S.-India 
relations were intensified in the wake of the Sino-Indian war of 1962), 
Pakistan moved to normalize its relations with the Soviet Union and to 
strengthen further its relationship with China.13 It signed an agreement on oil 
trade with the Soviet Union (1960) as well as a boundary agreement with 
China (1963). In April 1965, Pakistan’s President Ayub Khan visited 
Moscow and, one year later in the wake of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, 
the Soviet Union successfully mediated between the warring parties at 
Tashkent.14
When the political crisis in East Pakistan (which led to another India-
Pakistan war in 1971 and resulted in the birth of Bangladesh) started 
brewing, the Soviet Union again moved closer to India. Pakistan’s role in 
bringing rapprochement between Washington and Beijing by arranging 
Henry Kissinger’s (then President Richard Nixon’s National Security 
Advisor) secret trip to China further alienated Moscow from Islamabad. 
These developments eventually led to the Indo-Soviet friendship treaty of 
1971, which extended Moscow’s full support to India during the Indo-
                                                          
10 W. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York: Walder & Co, 1964), 40. 
11 Speech by Soviet Premier Nikolay Bulganin in Kabul during his visit on December 16–18, 
1955, reported in Dawn, December 18, 1955.
12 Mohammed Ahsen Chaudhri, “Pakistan’s Relations with the Soviet Union,” Asian Survey
6, no. 9 (September 1966): 492–500.
13 M. Ayub Khan, “The Pakistan-American Alliance: Stresses and Strains,” Foreign Affairs
42, no. 2 (January 1964).
14 Tahir Amin, Tashkent Declaration: Third Party’s Role in the Resolution of Conflict
(Islamabad: Institute of Strategic Studies, 1980).   
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Pakistani war of that year.15 Pakistan’s Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
visited the Soviet Union in 1972, and again in 1974, in an attempt to 
normalize the relationship between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. Pakistan 
withdrew from U.S.-sponsored military alliances and adopted a non-aligned 
foreign policy. It started to play an active role in the Non-Aligned Movement 
and more vigorously espoused Third World causes in international forums. 
By taking these measures, Pakistan adopted a course designed to distance 
itself from the West and to move closer to both China and Russia.
The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 led 
Pakistan once again to seek the support of the U.S. and Western countries.16
The containment of communism—the “red menace”—now became the focus 
of its policies. Pakistan feared the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union 
towards the Indian Ocean and lent its full support to the Afghan mujahedin 
against the Soviet troops. The Soviet Union again sought support from India 
and threatened to further dismember Pakistan, from which Bangladesh had 
separated only eight years earlier in 1971.17 Pakistan-Soviet Union relations 
remained intensely hostile until 1988, when the Soviet Union started to 
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan. A new phase in the relationship 
between the two countries was opened when the Soviet Union disintegrated 
and the Russian Federation was established in December 1991.
Post-Cold War Overtures
During the Soviet decades, Moscow’s political rivalries with Washington 
worsened the conflict between India and Pakistan and increasingly made the
region an arena for geopolitical contest. When the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, geo-economical competition gradually grew more important. 
Simultaneously, issues related to identity, culture and “civilization” assumed 
greater significance. Realist and traditional geopolitical interpretations lost 
their earlier significance and the new complexity of world politics made it 
increasingly important to understand these processes as an interplay of 
                                                          
15 Choudhury, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh. 
16 Tahir Amin, Afghanistan Crises: Implications and Options for Muslim World, Iran and 
Pakistan (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1982). 
17 Ibid.
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multiple world orders. The change of times was immediately manifested in 
the identity debates in which Russia found itself.18 Is Russia part of the West, 
as the new Atlantic-oriented foreign policy elites liked to argue; or is it a 
Eurasian power with a unique bridging position towards both Europe and 
Asia; or perhaps a more isolated historical-cultural formation with its own, 
distinctly “Slavic” features? Should Russia pursue an abiding policy towards 
the West, a pragmatic policy, or a more aggressive nationalist policy that 
would keenly protect Russia’s own national interests?19 During the first years 
of the re-born Russia, it was the Atlantic’s policy of “looking towards the 
West” that dominated. The new Russia that emerged under the leadership of 
Boris Yeltsin and his foreign minister Andrey Kozyrev was more interested 
in becoming part of Europe than representing Asia. Asia was regarded as an 
area of low priority. In these early years, Central Asia (as a former part of the 
Soviet Union) was mainly regarded as being part of the Islamic world and as 
a “burden” to be shed in the new post-Cold War era.20
In the first decade of the new Russia, South Asia assumed an even lower 
priority in the eyes of Moscow’s decision-makers. Russia-Pakistan relations 
focused on the issues of terrorism, Afghanistan and drug trafficking 
emanating from the region. The Russian government accused the Pakistani 
government of sponsoring terrorism in Chechnya and the Caucasus.21
Pakistan sought to allay Russian concerns by explaining that it was neither 
sponsoring nor encouraging terrorist movements in Central Asia or in any 
part of the Russian Federation. In 2000, during the second Chechen war, 
Pakistan even sent the Chief of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) General 
Mahmud Ahmad to reassure Russia that the Pakistani government was not 
involved in any of these activities.22 Another concern in Moscow was 
Pakistan’s support for the Taliban movement in Afghanistan, which 
                                                          
18 Christian Thorun, Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy: Role of Ideas in post-
Soviet Russia’s Conduct Towards the West (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
19 Stephen White, Understanding Russian Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2011).
20 Andrei Kortunov and Andrei Shoumikhin, “Russia and Central Asia: Evolution of mutual 
perceptions, policies and interdependence,” in Ethnic Challenges Beyond Borders: Chinese 
and Russian Perspectives of the Central Asian Conundrum, ed. Yongjin Zhang and Rouben 
Azizian, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), 20–26; Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian 
Policy Debate on Central Asia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995).
21 Rashid Ahmad, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Moscow’s new approach towards South Asia,”
The Diplomatic Insight 5, no. 7 (2012): 5–6.
22 Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations.” 
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Moscow’s decision-makers interpreted as having the ability to potentially 
undermine the status quo in entire Central Asia.23 Against the backdrop of 
Tajikistan’s Civil War (1992–1997) and the fragile peace attained to 
conclude it, Russia was deeply concerned about the spread of the armed 
insurgency to the other Central Asian states and to southern parts of Russia.24
These concerns were intertwined with the drug-trafficking business from 
Afghanistan which very easily reached Russia through the territory of 
Central Asia’s former Soviet republics.25 Pakistan was thus looked at from a 
perspective that connected it with this troubled zone and Russia’s 
burdensome historical “backyard.”
Islamabad, in turn, had hoped that the formulation of policy in the newly 
established Russian Federation would set New Delhi and Islamabad at an 
equidistance from Moscow. Strategic stability in South Asia continued to be 
the main concern of Pakistan’s decision-makers, who feared that the 
continuity of Indo-Russian ties, and especially the sales of sophisticated 
military hardware to India, would affect the precarious military balance 
between Pakistan and India. Immediately in 1992, the first year of the 
existence of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sardar Assef Ahmad 
Ali and the Foreign Secretary Akram Zaki visited Moscow in order to voice 
Pakistan’s concerns and to allay Russian fears over Pakistan’s support of 
militant insurgency in the region and even on Russian territory; and this 
message was repeated when Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited 
Moscow in 1999.26 The prospects of economic cooperation were also 
discussed and a joint commission to promote trade and economic cooperation 
between the two countries was formed in 1999. Although this was regarded 
as a sign of a new beginning, no major breakthrough followed that could 
ease the historical burden in the relationship.
                                                          
23 A. Z. Hilali, “Pakistan-Russia Relations: Bitter Cold War & Better Today,” The 
Diplomatic Insight 5, no. 6 (2012): 17–18.
24 Hussain, “Pak-Russia Relations.” 
25 Mohammad Farooq Afzal, “Pakistan-Russian Relations warm up,” Business Recorder, June 
12, 2013, http://www.brecorder.com/supplements/88/1269401/.
26 Zahid Anwar, “Pakistan-Russia Relations in the Regional and Global Context,” Central 
Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, June 30, 2004, http://old.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2237.  
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Relations After 9/11 
Autumn 2001 became a turning point: Pakistan’s volte-face in its policy on 
Afghanistan and its participation in the War on Terror removed a major 
irritant between Russia and Pakistan. Russia had been quite uncomfortable 
with Pakistan’s support of the Taliban, and all this was reversed in the wake 
of the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. In addition to Afghanistan and the 
Taliban, Moscow’s interests specifically focused on issues of terrorism, drug 
trafficking and the non-proliferation of nuclear materials (neither Pakistan 
nor India have joined the non-proliferation regime established in the NPT of 
1968). In February 2003, Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf visited 
Moscow and categorically declared that Pakistan regarded Chechnya as 
Russia’s internal problem and that it had no role whatsoever in encouraging 
or sponsoring Islamist networks in Central Asia or any areas of Russia. 
Although neighboring Afghanistan was a concern in Pakistan, its main 
interest in relations with Russia continued to relate to strategic stability in 
South Asia and the prospects of trade and economic cooperation between the 
two countries.27 This order of priorities was Islamabad’s own but was 
certainly facilitated by the presence of the U.S. and NATO-led forces in 
Afghanistan. 
Musharraf’s visit paved the way for more institutionalized cooperation 
between the two countries. Joint Working Groups on the issues of counter-
terrorism, strategic stability, and economic and cultural cooperation were 
established. In April 2007 Mikhail Fradkov was the first Russian Prime 
Minister to visit Pakistan. President Asif Ali Zardari visited Russia in 2011 
and invited President Vladimir Putin to Pakistan. Putin’s visit to Islamabad, 
planned for early October 2012, was cancelled at the last moment, and the 
event was immediately interpreted as a major setback in the attempts to 
improve relations. Moscow sent foreign minister Lavrov to assure Pakistan 
that the visit had been merely postponed because of scheduling issues.28
High-level visits of both Pakistani and Russian military and civil officials 
continued throughout 2013 and after. General Asif Kayani, the commander-
                                                          
27 Mohammad Faheem Khattak, “Pakistan-Russia Relations since 9/11: Implications for 
Pakistan’s Security,” (master’s thesis, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2011). 
28 “Lavrov Stresses Ties With Pakistan After Putin Cancels Visit,” The Moscow Times,
October 5, 2012, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/lavrov-stresses-ties-with-
pakistan-after-putin-cancels-visit/469309.html.
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in-chief of Pakistan’s army, visited Moscow twice and Russian military and 
Air Chiefs paid visits to Islamabad. However, this did not signal any 
breakthrough in the relations between Russia and Pakistan.29
Pakistan facilitated Russia’s entry into the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC), and Russia reciprocated by helping Pakistan to gain 
observer-status (and later in 2014 to start accession procedures to full 
membership) in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).30 Russia also 
agreed to the re-export of 150 engines of JF-17 planes from China to 
Pakistan and helped Pakistan in launching a communication satellite, Badar 
11.31 Russia has also signed a memorandum of understanding on the 
upgrading of a major steel mill in Pakistan, and it has expressed interest in 
the new strategic energy pipelines, of which the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–
Pakistan–India gas pipeline (TAPI) and the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline 
(IPI) are major examples. All this has meant that Russia’s annual trade with 
Pakistan has grown to half a billion dollars. Simultaneously, Russia has left 
relations with Islamabad in the cold by continuing to sell highly sophisticated 
military hardware to India and by supporting India’s case for a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council.32
It is against the background of a long period of “no breakthrough” that 
the visit of Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu in Islamabad on November 21, 
2014, and the signing of a deal on military cooperation were hailed as a 
“milestone development” by Pakistan’s Ministry of Defense.33 The 
agreement provides for the exchange of information on politico-military 
issues, cooperation in promoting international security, an intensification of 
counter-terrorism and arms-control activities, the strengthening of 
collaboration in various military fields, and sharing experiences in peace-
keeping operations. Joint efforts in fighting international terrorism and drug 
                                                          
29 Zahid Ali Khan, “New Trends in Pak-Russian Relations since 9/11,” Journal of the 
Research Society of Pakistan 48, no. 2 (2011). 
30 Asif Manzoor, “Pakistan Russia Relations in the Post-Cold War Era,” (master’s thesis, 
Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2014). The accession process for Pakistan’s 
membership in the SCO started at the organization’s summit in Ufa on July 10, 2015. 
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 “Pakistan, Russia ink milestone defence pact,” The News, November 21, 2014, 
http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-34246-Pakistan-Russia-ink-milestone-
defence-pact. The agreement also includes cooperation in the spheres of education and 
culture, as well as in a variety of scientific fields (medicine, topography, hydrography, etc.).
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trafficking were also discussed.34 The announcement by Shoigu confirming 
that “during the meeting, we agreed that bilateral military cooperation should 
have a great practical focus and contribute to increasing combat efficiency of 
our armed forces” was met with much appreciation in Islamabad.35
Reportedly, Russia gave its “political approval” to a deal to sell twenty MI-
35 helicopters to Pakistan.36
The significance ascribed to this new opening in Pakistan illustrates the 
great importance attached to cooperation in the military sector in this 
country. These developments also show how change in Pakistan-Russia 
relations reflects wider changes in world politics. Since 2014, the 
deterioration of Russia’s relations with Western states because of the crisis in 
Ukraine and the economic sanctions posed against it have alienated Russia 
from the Western liberal world order. After the collapse of the Soviet Union 
the triumph of this order had been made manifest in the foreign policy and 
international relations debates that claimed that the “end of history” (that is, 
the coming of Western liberal democracy and a downplaying of all 
differences making matters political) and “complex interdependence” were 
now the order of the day.37 In South Asia, specifically, it is India’s increasing 
collaboration with Western states—its move closer to the West through its 
multi-billion-dollar arms deal with a number of Western countries, its deals 
on civilian nuclear cooperation, and the development of a strategic 
partnership with the U.S.—which has pushed Russia to re-evaluate its 
policies and to move closer to Pakistan, which is a crucial player in the “end-
game” in Afghanistan.
                                                          
34 Ibid.
35 Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan, Russia sign landmark defence cooperation agreement,” 
Dawn, November 21, 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1145875. 
36 Ibid.
37 These are the broad political implications of the debates which, in research literature, 
crystallize in works such as Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
(Toronto: Maxwell, 1992) and Joseph S. Nye Jr. “What New World Order?,” Foreign 
Affairs 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 83–96. 
202
Future Prospects
From Russia’s perspective the possibility to exchange information and 
intelligence with Pakistan is extremely important to its prospects for 
controlling the processes shaping the region. Russia has repeatedly voiced its 
anxieties to Islamabad about the possible chaos that threatens to destabilize 
the borders of Central Asian regimes and also spill across the southern 
borders of Russia. These concerns were summarized by Russian Deputy 
Foreign Minister Sergey A. Ryabkov when he visited Pakistan on January 
24, 2011: 
“The ultimate objective of Pakistan and the Russian Federation is to combat the 
growing menace of terrorism and militancy, and to sabotage the nexus between 
transnational terrorist organizations. The transnational militant organizations 
have been undermining both states’ internal security. The link among al-Qaeda, 
Afghan Taliban, Tehrik-i-Taliban, the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan and 
militants from the North Caucasus and other Muslim Russian regions has been 
devastating and destabilizing for both Pakistan and Russian Federation.”38
Pakistan, too, is deeply concerned over the developments on its own border 
with Afghanistan—the Durand line, which even without the current pressures
is extremely problematic. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) movement 
has been fighting Pakistani armed forces in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) since 2007, and the erosion of the writ of the Pakistani 
state in the tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan keeps Islamabad on alert.  
Pakistani military forces have launched a major military operation, Zarb-e-
Azb, in these areas with the stated goal of eliminating all those terrorist 
groups fighting against the Pakistani state. Thus, whilst Pakistan is fighting 
for the unity of its own state, it is also working to prevent the kind of anarchy 
(the “Coming Anarchy”)39 that, within the liberal world order, is seen to 
result from a decay of state structures in many non-Western parts of the 
world and prepare breeding grounds for terrorism. At the same time the 
border is far too much of a political and ethnic mosaic, and the inter-state 
relations in the region too conflicted, for any consistent and all-encompassing
front against militant insurgency to develop. The strong reactions of the 
                                                          
38 Cited in Khan, “New Trends in Pak-Russian Relations.”
39 Robert D. Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” The Atlantic Monthly 273, no. 2 (February 
1994): 44–77. 
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Pakistani government against the U.S. drone strikes in its western regions
illustrate policies that emphasize formal sovereignty; yet, they also show just 
how much the Pakistani government needs the support of the large 
populations living in the north-western regions and the wide stretch of land 
along the border with Afghanistan. Because it is highly problematic for 
Pakistan to participate in the U.S.-led global war against terrorism on its own 
territory, its fight against the anarchy in which the self-image of the Western 
liberal order crumbles cannot but be fraught with contradiction. 
Due to this very complex border problematique, any development in 
Afghanistan will immediately impact the political and ethnic mosaic in the 
unsettled border areas of Pakistan and stir the pieces into the form of a new 
puzzle. The revival of the Pashtunistan issue between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan has been one of the perennial problems for Pakistani leaders. If 
the Taliban were to achieve victory in Afghanistan, the TTP, which already 
claims the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan, would be further 
emboldened: a separate enclave along the border could be demanded, thereby 
also reviving the dispute over an independent Pashtunistan. Other possible 
courses of development are the maintenance of the status quo; the eruption of 
a full-scale civil war between the contending groups, or at the least a form of 
prolonged chaos; and the reaching of an agreement over a broad-based 
power-sharing formula amongst the contending groups. Each of the above 
alternative developments has different implications for Afghanistan and the 
wider Central Asian region, and also for Pakistan-Russia relations.40
The enthusiastic turnout of voters in the presidential elections in 
Afghanistan in 2014 gives hope that perhaps the status quo can hold even 
after the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO-led forces from Afghanistan. In 
September 2014, Ashraf Ghani, the new president of Afghanistan following 
these elections, agreed to the Bilateral Security Assistance Pact with the U.S. 
which his predecessor Hamid Karzai had been reluctant to sign. President 
Ghani has visited Pakistan to seek improved relations and he has undertaken 
an initiative to bring the Taliban into negotiations. However, the maintenance 
of the status quo seems unlikely in the case of the Western military almost 
entirely (leaving hundreds rather than thousands of troops in place) 
withdrawing from the country. The Afghan National Army would be 
                                                          
40 Seth G. Jones and Keith Crane, “Afghanistan After the Drawdown,” Council on Foreign 
Relations, Special Report no. 67 (November 2013).
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unlikely to withstand the onslaught of Taliban insurgents for a longer period 
of time. The regime may hold for some time; but it would eventually start to 
crumble as a result of desertions from the national army and shrinking 
international support. 
A Taliban victory would spell disaster for the region as it would revive 
fears in Russia, China, the Central Asian states, India, Iran, and Pakistan over 
the potential instability of their borders. Although the Taliban are less likely 
to spread beyond Afghan borders out of fear of international reaction, their 
victory within the country would create a backlash from other ethnic groups 
in Afghanistan. This situation would be very difficult for the Taliban to 
handle and, therefore, the third possible scenario for future developments is 
the re-eruption of civil war between the major ethnic groups of Afghanistan. 
These groups would seek the help of their international supporters, possibly 
recreating the scenario of the 1990s when Pakistan was supporting Pashtun 
groups and Tajik, Hazaras and Uzbeks were being supported by India, 
Russia, the Central Asian states, and Iran. A new civil war could also bring 
about the balkanization of Afghanistan and lead to the creation of separate 
ethnic enclaves. The fourth possibility for the future would be that 
Afghanistan’s ethnic groups could devise some broad power-sharing formula 
amongst themselves without involving outside parties. Such a solution could 
not only bring peace to Afghanistan but also stabilize the wider region. 
However, when power-sharing formulas are incomplete and do not work to 
the satisfaction of all parties, the only option that remains for those opposing 
the regime is to move across the borders and start preparing a new round in 
the conflict. This is a common pattern in many states of the region and can 
only be prevented if Afghanistan grows to become a strong state, both 
internally as well as externally. Today, just as much as it was in the wake of 
9/11/2001, this is an unachievable mission if foreign forces are not prepared 
to sustain the Afghan state militarily and economically. 
Conclusion
At present the relationship between Pakistan and Russia is no longer hostile 
for ideological reasons that could be perceived as threatening Pakistan from 
the inside and forcing it to crumble along its land borders. On the contrary, a 
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convergence of interests in respect to Afghanistan and its potentially 
destabilizing effects on Central Asia and parts of southern Russia has 
induced Russia and Pakistan to cooperate with each other. However, the fact 
that substantive cooperation has only recently developed despite its 
preparation at the declaratory level over the years, tells us that Russia 
continues to consider its policies towards Pakistan in relation to its policies 
with other countries and, especially, its relations with India. If India 
increasingly integrates into the world order of the Western states, its strategic 
partnership with Russia will relatively come to weigh less, and Russia in turn 
will be willing to explore new markets in the region and to look for them also 
in Pakistan. The fact that China also fears the possible spillover effect of 
Islamic militancy in Afghanistan that could destabilize its already potentially 
restive Xinjiang region may further promote Pakistan-Russia cooperation in 
the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.  
The Chinese or “Sinic” world order is expanding in Central and South 
Asia, and the practical implications of this process depend on how this order 
takes shape within China’s internal discourses: whether or not China should 
act as a “strong state,” and whether it should follow a pragmatic policy or, 
rather, more aggressively pursue a nationalist policy.41 Indic and Islamic 
world orders are also waxing in the region and can be similarly identified 
through the identity debates that prescribe alternative visions of the world for 
action (for different foreign policy strategies).42 Thus, while the Western 
withdrawal means that the influence of the Western liberal world order 
enjoys fewer prospects in the region, its retreat is not due to radicalized 
militant Islam. Although Afghanistan is the pivotal point of a deeply 
“civilizational” struggle, the impacts of Islamic, Indic and Sinic culture will 
be increasingly felt in the economies and everyday lives in the region quite 
independently of such a struggle. In this setting, Russia’s possibilities to gain 
influence depend on its collaboration with other countries and its ability to 
connect with especially the Islamic, Indic, and Sinic world orders (arguably, 
it is already connected with the Western liberal order). These orders, as 
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already emphasized, are not given entities; rather, they are sets of practices 
embodied in action and discourse. 
One such discourse is the “Clash of Civilizations,” which together with 
those already mentioned (and many others not mentioned) are symbolic 
representations of the Western liberal world order.43 We conclude this 
chapter by calling attention to the practical implications of this concept 
which basically puts traditional realist “struggle for power” in the frame of 
“culture.” Although the conflict between Islamic religious forces and secular 
(mostly authoritarian) governments in Central and South Asia is very much a 
“clash” of “civilizational” proportions, it is far from being a conflict between 
cultural entities with distinct boundaries. Under present circumstances when 
the Taliban, its associates and, more recently, also the Islamic State is 
preparing to strengthen their positions in Afghanistan, images like this can 
obstruct our identification of real problems. The question for the coming 
years is whether the fear of transnational militant Islam, which in recent 
years has been on the rise in the region of our focus due to the developments 
especially in northern Afghanistan, can bring about a broad-based 
collaboration against these specific forms of Islam. Such a “new great game” 
puts Pakistan in a pivotal position and requires wise policies which avoid 
treating different groups as simply “enemies.” Unless such a “front” can be 
built on the ground, any international cooperation on it remains ineffective. 
Concerning the role of Russia specifically, the policies which deepen the 
conflict between Pakistan and India can best be kept under control if 
“multipolarity”44 as a basis of communication is chosen from amongst the 
many discourses articulating the Western liberal order.
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